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1 May 1964

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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State Dept. review completed

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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*Cuba: Castro's proposal to submit the question of US overflights to the International Court of Justice is a further attempt to embarrass the US.

This bid was coupled with renewed threats to use Soviet-supplied weapons against US reconnaissance aircraft and also with renewed expressions of willingness to negotiate with the US, provided 'provocations' are halted.

These are typical Communist tactics, combining threats and inducements calculated to increase the political costs to the US of continuing the overflights and to encourage the US eventually to consider some form of negotiated settlement of a whole range of US-Cuban issues.

Moscow's intention to maintain firm support for Castro's political offensive was evident in Mikoyan's raising of the overflight question in his talk with US Ambassador Kohler at a Moscow reception on 29 April. He claimed that US statements regarding the overflights had made a Soviet reply necessary and he repeated points in the 24 April Izvestia article regarding the illegality of the flights and Castro's right to challenge them.

Although the Cubans and Soviets almost certainly have little expectation that the US will agree to submit this issue to adjudication, they appear confident that Cuba will be able to marshal international sympathy as a "victim of illegal US actions" and as a nation attempting to find a peaceful solution to a dangerous situation.

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<u>Brazil:</u> There are indications that some Brazilian military leaders are becoming dissatisfied with President Castello Branco's policies.

high-ranking officers in Rio de Janeiro are
"extremely concerned" that Castello Branco is allowing politicians to exert too great an influence on the government's policies. if Castello Branco continues his present course, he will be warned that his first responsibility is to carry out the goals of the revolution.

A major source of anxiety within military circles is the possibility that political leaders such as ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek will gradually regain positions of power and influence. The military probably is also troubled by the prospect that, despite the recent purge, the old alliance between Kubitschek's Social Democratic Party and Goulart's Brazilian Labor Party will one day be restored and become a serious challenge to their rule.

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Mexico: Communists are exploiting peasant unrest in northern Mexico where serious disturbances may break out before national elections are held on 5 July.

The poverty-stricken peasants in this area are resentful and sullen over the government's failure to improve their lot. In recent months, Communist agitation in Chihuahua State touched off a series of land invasions. Peasants and students also physically assaulted Gustavo Diaz Ordaz, the ruling party's presidential candidate who is certain to win in July, while he was campaigning in Chihuahua last month.

25X1 peasant leaders claim that arms are available in the states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, and Chihuahua for their followers, who are bent on taking violent action in early May.

Communists also are promoting protests against the Colorado River's saline content, which rose sharply last month, and which has caused extensive damage in the agricultural areas of Baja California.

President Lopez Mateos and other Mexican officials are greatly concerned over the success Communist agitators have achieved in winning influence among the peasants of north Mexico. They also fear that the Communists may try to assassinate Diaz Ordaz.

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

Haiti: The Duvalier government is apparently behind a new spate of rumors that US Ambassador Timmons is to be declared persona non grata. The preliminary view of the US Embassy is that these rumors are intended to convey the regime's displeasure over what it sees as US criticism of the "Duvalier for life" campaign, and its unhappiness over Washington's failure to be more responsive to requests for aid. The embassy notes, however, that the Haitians did not shrink from taking PNG action against Timmons' predecessor a year ago this month.

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Finland: The US Embassy believes that President Kekkonen instigated the current effort to replace the four-month-old caretaker government with a coalition cabinet enjoying a parliamentary majority. Although differences still exist, prospects for such a coalition to emerge from talks now under way between the Agrarians and three other parties appear fairly good. Kekkonen presumably feels that such a government would strengthen his hand in dealing with the Soviets, as well as forestall opposition demands for a general election at a time when his Agrarian Party is having trouble maintaining its unity.

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*Portugal: The Portuguese Security Police (PIDE) are alerted to cope with the "moderate" mass participation they expect during Communist-sponsored May Day demonstrations in Lisbon, Oporto, and other cities. The Patriotic Front of National Liberation (FPLN), the Algeria-based organization which seeks to over-throw Salazar, appears to have made a maximum effort to launch its "first uprising" on 1 May. The US Embassy also comments that the stage appears set for some type of confrontation, and that while the security forces appear able to deal with any likely situation, the methods employed by the police will determine the seriousness, duration, and degree of popular support achieved.

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